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Abstract: This paper investigates Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi, the First President of the Republic 
of China)’s vision for returning to mainland China during the period of the two Taiwan Strait Crises in 
the 1950s through the analysis of Taiwanese archival documents. Some conclusions can be drawn 
from the analysis presented here. First, Taiwanese archival documents show that the United States was 
more actively encouraging the Republic of China [ROC] to hold and even take advantage of the 
offshore islands, the Da-chen Islands in particular. The U.S.’s attitude may have maintained or 
strengthened Chiang Kai-shek’s hope that he would be able to return to the mainland of China. 
Second, Chiang had paid enormous attention to the People’s Republic of China [PRC]-Soviet 
relations, and when he discussed the subject with allied U.S. officials, he emphasized that the Soviet 
Union would not intervene even if the ROC conducted a counter-offensive against the Chinese 
mainland. While it is difficult to judge whether Chiang’s analysis of Soviet intentions concerning the 
defense of the PRC was motivated by his desire to entrap the United States or if it was the outcome of 
more cool-headed logical thinking, his observances of the signs of the split between Beijing and 
Moscow after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 was remarkably accurate. It is possible that 
Chiang may have thought that his chance of returning to mainland China would be greater in the late 
1950s and the early 1960s. The critical piece that he needed to realize his dream, however, was 
support from the United States who ironically became more reluctant as time went on. 
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Introduction: 
There have been few studies that utilize Taiwanese sources to highlight how 
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi, the First President of the Republic of China) understood 
the issue of the Republic of China’s (ROC) government returning to mainland China. 
Most studies on this issue have focused on Taiwan’s diplomatic history in the 1950s in 
the context of U.S.-China or U.S.-Taiwan relations based on diplomatic and archival 
documents available in the United States, such as the Foreign Relations of the United 
States (FRUS). One of the reasons why this issue has been analyzed only from the 
context of bilateral relations has been that the availability of diplomatic documents 
from Taiwan has been very limited for a long time. It had been very difficult, as a 
result, to know Taiwan’s diplomatic history from Taiwanese perspectives. However, 
thanks to democratization in Taiwan, archives such as Academia Historica, Academia 
Sinica’s Institute of Modern History Archive, and the Kuomintang Archive have begun 
to open various ROC governmental documents. Because of these developments, it has 
become possible for researchers to examine Taiwan’s diplomatic history during the 
Cold War not only from U.S. but also Taiwanese perspectives. 
This paper investigates Chiang Kai-shek’s vision for returning to mainland 
China in the 1950s through the analysis of Taiwanese archival documents. In particular, 
it focuses on Chiang Kai-shek’s remarks and conversations with high-ranking U.S. 
officials during the period of the two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s. This project is 
based on the author’s ongoing archival research in Taiwan.  
In the following sections, I first explain the issues concerning the defense of the 
so-called offshore islands, which the ROC considered to be the spring board for 
returning to the mainland. Special attention is paid to the Da-chen Islands defense. 
Next, I highlight Chiang Kai-shek’s analysis of the relations between the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. Both issues were significantly related 
to the ROC agenda of returning to mainland China. In doing so, I utilize archival 
materials that I uncovered in Taiwan.  
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Chiang Kai-shek’s Vision for Returning to China and the Offshore Islands Issue: 
   How did the United States attempt to manage the issue of Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
returning to mainland China? According to one archival record, before the first Taiwan 
Strait Crisis in 1954 to 1955, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been 
vigorously conducting activities to assist the ROC’s military preparedness on the 
offshore islands for returning to China in the future. After transferring the ROC’s 
capital to Taiwan in 1949, the offshore islands, such as Jinmen, the Mazu, the Da-chen, 
the Yijiangshan islands along the coast of mainland China, had been regarded as 
important strongholds for the ROC for conducting limited counter-offensives against 
the PRC.  
There is a record of conversations among Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. Ambassador 
to the ROC Karl Rankin, and an U.S. Navy Vice Admiral officer on April 15, 19531. 
According to the record, the U.S. side made clear that the CIA’s obligation toward the 
ROC should cover the whole of China and that her main missions included training for 
the ROC’s guerrilla forces, conducting psychological operations against enemies, and 
intelligence gathering. Moreover, the document reveals that the U.S. Military 
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)’s obligation did not cover training for the ROC’s 
guerrilla forces in offshore islands. Chiang Kai-shek references this situation:  
 
If the ROC’s guerrilla forces, trained by the MAAG, conducted counterattacks 
against mainland China, it might negatively affect the U.S. government. That is to 
say, the U.S. public opinion might become critical of the U.S. 
government…however, the CIA’s activities in the offshore islands were unofficial, 
and there were no such problems.2  
 
As this document makes clear, the U.S. government tried to assist the ROC’s limited 
                                                        
1 005-010205-00108-006, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
2 005-010205-00108-006, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
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counter-offensives against the mainland not through the MAAG but through the CIA’s 
unofficial activities. 
After initiating the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) launched an attack against the Da-chen Islands and the Yijiangshan Island, the 
latter of which was captured by the PLA in January 1955.3 After the announcement of 
Yijiangshan’s fall, the U.S. government strongly urged Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw 
from the Da-chen Islands. According to conventional wisdom, the U.S. government 
faced extreme difficulty in persuading Chiang Kai-shek to do so. Because of this, it is 
often argued that Chiang was irrationally obsessed with the defense of the offshore 
islands despite the huge risk of causing a major military clash. 
It is true that Chiang did not easily accept the withdrawal of the ROC forces 
from the Da-chen Islands. But the ROC archival records show that there was a 
legitimate reason why Chiang was so reluctant to accept the withdrawal. As it turned 
out, Chiang did not simply persist in defending the Da-chen Islands in order to 
maintain hope of ultimately returning to the mainland; it was the United States that had 
encouraged and even instructed the ROC to fortify the defense of the Da-chen before 
the first Taiwan Strait Crisis had begun. The ROC archival documents reveal that 
before the beginning of the crisis, the U.S. government strongly encouraged the ROC 
government to enhance the Da-chen’s defenses and even recommended that the ROC 
blockade the PRC’s shipping around the Da-chen and other offshore islands.4 
It is important to note that the ROC military was not initially enthusiastic about 
the blockade plan near the Da-chen because it considered the defense conditions of the 
islands to be fragile, and it would be difficult to blockade near the islands without 
strengthening the ROC’s defense capabilities there.5 The ROC even argued that if the 
U.S. government still wanted them to strengthen the defense of the offshore islands, 
                                                        
3 Yijiangshan Island was located along the defense line of the Da-chen Islands, and it was believed that 
if the islands fell, the defense of the Da-chen Islands would be next to impossible. 
4 409/0236, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 
Taipei. Translated by author. 
5 Ibid. 
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additional military aid and assistance from the United States would be required.6 
While this counter-proposal may have been partly a tactic to receive more aid from the 
United States, the fact that the ROC was aware of the difficulty in defending the 
Da-chen Islands is significant.  
On July 18, 1953, Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied by the ROC Foreign Minister 
George Yeh (Yeh Kung-ch’ao), had a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Rankin in Taipei 
and stated:  
    
The Da-chen Islands are too far away from Taipei and too close to Wenzhou. The 
PRC can easily seize the islands anytime. Without strengthening the U.S. military 
assistance for the islands, it would be difficult to retain them. Therefore, we 
would like to suggest that the U.S. recognize the offshore islands, including the 
Da-chen Islands, as falling within the range of U.S. military assistance and that 
the Seventh Fleet patrol them.7 
 
In this meeting, while Chiang Kai-shek expressed his appreciation for the CIA’s 
activities on the Da-chen Islands, he asserted that the offshore islands should be 
included in the scope of U.S. defense perimeter. In response, U.S. Ambassador Rankin 
explained that Admiral Arthur Radford was in charge of the U.S. military policy, and 
that he expected that the offshore islands would be included in the range of U.S. 
military assistance in the near future. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek explained that in 
addition to the ROC’s military power, if U.S. navy and air forces were added, the 
Da-chen Islands could be protected. Ambassador Rankin replied that he expected to 
give substantial support to the ROC because of moral reasons, but if the PLA invaded 
the Da-chen Islands then it would be difficult for the United States to declare war 
against the PRC. Foreign Minister Yeh explained that the ROC did not ask the United 
                                                        
6 Ibid. 
7 005-010205-00079-011, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
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States to take over the defense of the islands, but that it would rather desire that the 
Seventh Fleet cover the Da-chen Islands as a part of its patrol and that submarines be 
provided to the ROC’s navy. 
   The U.S. government requested on another occasion that the ROC government 
should increase the latter’s defense efforts for the Da-chen Islands. In the meeting with 
the ROC Foreign Minister Yeh on August 12, 1953, U.S. Ambassador Rankin stated: 
 
Washington hoped that the Chinese government would make every effort to retain 
the islands, particularly the Da-chen islands, while the matter of integrating those 
islands into the defense scheme of Taiwan and the Pescadores was being actively 
studied pending the assumption of office of Admiral Radford as Chairman of the 
Joint Chief of Staff.8 
 
As this message indicates, the U.S. government was actively encouraging the ROC to 
defend the offshore islands, including the Da-chen islands, before the first Taiwan 
Strait Crisis erupted. The situation around that time did not allow Chiang Kai-shek to 
refuse such a request from the U.S., as the ROC was in the midst of negotiations with 
the country to conclude a mutual security treaty.  
However, the U.S. government changed its attitude toward the offshore islands 
after the first Taiwan Strait Crisis began as it recognized operational difficulties and 
risks involving their defense. When the U.S. government asked the ROC to withdraw 
its troops from the Da-chen Islands, Chiang Kai-shek strongly criticized such a sudden 
change in U.S. policy. Chiang’s reaction was understandable, given that he had been 
trying to improve the islands’ defense precisely because the United States had 
requested he do so. Judging from the analysis provided above, it is not an exaggeration 
that certain U.S. actions toward the ROC and U.S. high officials’ communications with 
Chiang Kai-shek encouraged him to expect that the United States might help him 
                                                        
8 426.2/0001, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 
Taipei. Translated by author. 
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initiate counter-offensives against the PRC and possibly return to the mainland.  
   Taiwan’s archival documents show that U.S. military high ranking officers 
repeatedly encouraged Chiang Kai-shek to counterattack mainland China even right 
after the Da-chen Islands were attacked on January 10. There was a meeting between 
Chiang Kai-shek and General Bolte Deputy Chief Staff Army on January 15, 1955 at 
the Presidential Residence in Shilin in Taipei. Chiang Kai-shek insisted that serious 
damages would be done to the defense and morale of the ROC if the Da-chen Islands 
were invaded by the PLA. He thus argued that an announcement should be made that 
the Da-chen and other offshore islands were included within the geographic scope of 
defense cooperation between the ROC and the United States.9 Bolte did not directly 
reply to Chiang Kai-shek’s insistence, but he expressed his hope to participate in “the 
great endeavor of returning to mainland China when the time was ripe.”10 
   There was another meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and a U.S. high-ranking 
military officer on January 15, 1955. Chiang Kai-shek asked the major general whether 
there was any opinion on the offshore islands affair. The military officer replied: 
 
When the PRC attacked the offshore islands in September 1954, the ROC’s 
forces promptly managed the crisis and its operation succeeded. However, when 
the Da-chen Islands were attacked on January 10, 1955, the ROC’s army did not 
retaliate against the PLA. Personally, I am very disappointed at the ROC’s 
handling of the situation at that time. In my opinion, the ROC’s air force should 
retaliate by conducting low-altitude flight bombings. If not, a suspicion could 
arise as to whether the ROC would be able to return to mainland China or not.11 
 
Chiang Kai-shek only answered that the ROC was in preparation of retaliatory 
                                                        
9 Whether the offshore islands were included in the scope of the ROC-US security treaty had remained 
ambiguous since the conclusion of the treaty in December 1954. 
10 005-010205-00080-001, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
11 005-010205-00080-002, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
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measures concerning the PLA’s attack against the Da-chen Islands. It is remarkable 
that right after the Da-chen Islands were attacked by the PLA and right before the 
decision to withdraw from the islands was made, the high-ranking U.S. military 
officials directly spoke to Chiang Kai-shek, recommended strengthening the Da-chen’s 
defenses, and hinted at their willingness to assist the ROC’s retaliation. It is probable 
that what the U.S. military officials indicated was not the official policy of the United 
States. But even if that had been the case, it is easy to imagine that their attitudes 
encouraged Chiang Kai-shek to develop a stronger hope for realizing a return to the 
Chinese mainland in the future. 
   After the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-55, the ambassadorial talks between the 
United States and the PRC began. Even during the period, there were some meetings in 
which the U.S. and the ROC government officials discussed the issue of returning to 
China, although the U.S. officers’ enthusiasm lessened compared to their prior attitude. 
According to a record of a conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State Walter Robertson on March 16, 1956, at the Presidential Residence 
in Shilin, Robertson asked Chiang Kai-shek about the ROC’s planning for returning to 
China. Chiang Kai-shek answered: 
 
It would be difficult to return to China right now; however, it would be 
impossible to maintain status quo eternally. Therefore, within several years, I 
would like to return to China. It will take some time, and the U.S. support will be 
absolutely important.12 
 
Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek revealed a more concrete timetable for returning to 
China. In a meeting among Chiang Kai-shek, other ROC leaders, and Admiral Radford 
at the Presidential Resident at Yangmingshan Mountain. Chiang Kai-shek discussed the 
issue of returning to China: 
                                                        
12 005-010205-00082-001, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
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     I have been to Taiwan. If there was no vision and plan for returning to China, it 
would be meaningless for me to be there. As far as the timetable is concerned, 
we would need the U.S. government’s consultation and agreement in advance. 
Without the U.S. agreement, the ROC’s morale will be harmed…we should 
mobilize a revolutionary movement in mainland China in order to successfully 
return to China. If we lose out on timing, it would be more difficult to return to 
China. Thus, we definitely need cooperation from the U.S. government.13 
 
Radford stated that currently a majority of countries were opposed to the ROC’s 
counter-offensive toward mainland China. He said that the U.S. government was 
willing to provide aid to the ROC and that, in fact, President Eisenhower intended to 
do so. However, it was difficult for the Eisenhower administration to express its 
support for the ROC’s counter-offensive to the mainland officially because doing so 
would negatively influence the presidential election. This hesitation suggests that 
Radford’s and the U.S. government’s attitude toward aiding the ROC had diminished. 
It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that discussions of a counter-offensive to the mainland 
was not taboo even after the conclusion of the U.S.-ROC security treaty in 1954 and 
that the allied officials continued to exchange opinions on the possibility of an 
offensive.  
 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Views of Returning to the Chinese Mainland and of Sino-Soviet Relations 
This section analyzes, based on Taiwanese archival materials, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
views of the Sino-Soviet relations in the context of his vision for returning to the 
Chinese mainland. In discussing with U.S. government officials the need for a 
counter-offensive against the PRC, Chiang often made predictions about how the 
Soviet Union would respond to such an act by the ROC. For instance, in three 
                                                        
13 005-010205-00075-005, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
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meetings with U.S. Vice President Nixon in November 9, 1953, Chiang displayed his 
own view regarding strategic situations in East Asia and laid out his ideas of how to 
deal with the situation. First, Chiang elaborated on how he viewed the Soviet strategy 
in East Asia. He argued that “[i]n Soviet strategy, cold war is hot war,” indicating that 
the Soviet’s strategic interests lay in buying time to develop its own capabilities while 
keeping the United States engaged in constant Cold War tensions without direct 
involvement.14 From this, Chiang predicted the Soviet reaction to a counter-offensive 
against the PRC as follows:  
 
It is my conviction that Russia will never intervene openly in the hostilities 
when we launch a counterattack on the Mainland because that would defeat the 
Soviet policy of not taking an active part in war and of actually achieving its 
plan of world conquest without getting directly involved militarily. I believe that 
Russia will never enter a war unless it is absolutely necessary. The question 
naturally arises as to when it will be absolutely necessary for Russia to enter a 
war. I believe the time will come when the balance of power between the U.S. 
and Russia will be drastically upset; that is, when most of the countries of the 
world are either pro-Communist or have adopted a neutral stand, and the U.S. is 
placed in an isolated position.15 
 
This logic was certainly self-serving; since the ROC needed to acquire substantial U.S. 
support for launching its counter-attacks against the PRC, it wanted to persuade the 
U.S. government that Soviet involvement in a war against the PRC was unlikely. Even 
so, the logic that Chiang employed here was not inconsistent but instead close to the 
line of hawkish realists; although, he still may have underestimated the possibility of 
Soviet intervention to support the PRC.  
                                                        
14 407.1/0185, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 
Taipei. Translated by author. 
15 Ibid. 
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On May 20, 1954, Chiang met U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and 
U.S. Ambassador Rankin at the Presidential Residence in Shilin. When Wilson stated 
that the United States must take a cautious stance on the Chinese Nationalists’ 
counterattacks against the mainland and that the Soviet Union’s response to the ROC’s 
counterattacks could not be predicted, Chiang responded as follows:  
 
We understand the concerns of the U.S., but even if our military conducts a 
counter-offensive operation, the Soviet Union would definitely not participate. 
Our military would take the entire responsibility. This is genuinely China’s 
problem. I believe that we should also take into account the experiences from our 
past struggles. Although the Korean War was a large-scale war, the Soviet Union 
did not directly participate in the war, only the PRC did. In the case of the 
Vietnam war, neither the Soviet Union nor China participated directly. I believe 
that the Soviet Union would definitely not initiate a world war simply because 
they belong to a Communist bloc.16 
 
Furthermore, on May 28, 1954, when Chiang Kai-shek met U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense W. J. McNeil, General Van Fleet, U.S. Ambassador Rankin, and 
Foreign Minister Yeh at the Presidential Residence in Yangmingshan, he referred to the 
necessity for concluding a defense treaty between the U.S. and the ROC governments. 
In so doing, he stated that the ROC had no intention of involving the United States in 
joint operations for counterattacking mainland China. He emphasized that the 
conclusion of a U.S.-ROC security treaty would “bolster the confidence” of people in 
mainland China that the Nationalists would someday return there, and the only duty for 
the United States would be to recognize the territories that the ROC desired to 
recover.”17 
                                                        
16 005-010205-00075-002, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
17 002-080106-00034-010, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
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Foreign Minister Yeh added to Chiang’s comment, saying that the significance of 
the proposed U.S.-ROC treaty rested not on its military but on its political 
ramifications. He specifically stated that the reasons why the ROC emphasized the task 
of returning to the mainland were “70 percent political and 30 percent military.” On the 
other hand, Yeh stated that the ROC’s military job would be greatly facilitated if the 
United States provided “adequate political support.” Chiang also noted, “As to military 
aid, we do not need American ground forces. If we can get air support, so much better; 
otherwise, we shall only want United States aid in training and equipping our Air Force 
and continuous logistical support. In addition, we must also have United States naval 
support in blockading the China coast.”18 
It should be noted that Chiang proposed to the United States that the scope of the 
treaty should include the entire Chinese mainland. This implied that the probability of 
the United States being entrapped would increase in the event of a military clash 
between the ROC and PRC governments. Despite this fact, Chiang emphasized that the 
significance of the counterattack against the mainland lay not so much in military as in 
political aspects. In addition, Chiang again insisted in this meeting that he was 
convinced that the Soviet Union would not desire to enter into a war on mainland 
China in support of the PRC’s side even if the ROC initiated a counterattack.  
As these Taiwanese archival sources indicate, Chiang consistently predicted that 
the Soviet Union would not participate in a war to support the Chinese Communist 
Party [CCP] even if the ROC conducted a counterattack against mainland China. It is 
difficult to judge from these materials whether this was the result of Chiang’s logical 
analysis or nothing but rhetoric to encourage the United States’ involvement in his 
attempt to return to the mainland.  
However, it is noteworthy that there was a discussion between the U.S. and the 
ROC governments on the readiness to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese 
Communists based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would not intervene. On 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
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March 16, 1958, Chiang Kai-shek met Admiral Felix B. Stump, the U.S. Commander 
in Chief in the Pacific, at the Presidential Residence in Shilin. In the meeting, Stamp 
discussed with Chiang “the concept of operations using nuclear weapons.” He 
explained that the United States had emphasized three times in the past meetings of the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) that it would aid its allies by promptly 
using its atomic weapons in the event of a large-scale invasion. He also stated that if 
South Vietnam was invaded, the United States should immediately protect its major 
cities and military bases, and that “the United States should at the same time warn Red 
China by attacking with small tactical nuclear weapons North Vietnamese railroads and 
other lines of transportation that connected Chinese railroads.” He asserted that if Mao 
Zedong, Chairman of the PRC, neglected this warning, the United States would expand 
its offensive to Guangdong and advance to the north and demonstrate the power of 
atomic weapons.19  
Chiang Kai-shek agreed with the U.S. explanations, and he expressed a desire 
that the U.S. military would secretly proceed in preparing the plan. Stump responded 
by stating that the United States was already moving forward (hinting at the use of 
nuclear weapons), and that he wanted to put it into effect when appropriate; both then 
agreed.20 This seems to suggest that there were some exchanges of opinions between 
the U.S. and Taiwanese sides on the use of nuclear weapons against China around 
March 1958. 
Chiang revealed his more interesting views on Sino-Soviet relations after the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis had begun. On November 10, 1958, he met a military 
high-ranking officer at the Presidential Residence in Shilin. Chiang maintained that 
while his air force maintained superiority over the Taiwan Strait, the Soviet Union 
would likely provide active support for Red China’s air force, and thus, he argued that 
the ROC needed U.S. support. In responding to the inquiry from the U.S. as to whether 
                                                        
19 005-010205-00084-004, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
20 Ibid. 
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or not a split was emerging between Moscow and Beijing (whether or not the Soviet 
Union’s leader, Nikita Khrushchev had confidence in Mao Zhedong), Chiang said that 
“although he could not say definitively, it was true that the Soviet Union was 
disappointed with the poor capability of the Communist China’s air force during the 
Second Taiwan Crisis.” He pointed out that the Chinese Communist military leader Su 
Yu was dismissed one day before the ceasefire was announced, and that this fact 
proved there was a serious rift within the PRC. Su Yu had studied in the Soviet Union, 
and he had been arguing, even during peacetime, that China should occupy Taiwan, 
Pescadores, and Jinmen. He was dismissed because he expressed to Mao and Peng 
De-huai his opposition to the ceasefire. This was, in Chiang’s view, a military victory 
for the United States and the ROC.21 It is noteworthy that Chiang referred to the 
possibility of a Sino-Soviet rift soon after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis faded.  
Furthermore, Chiang commented on Sino-Soviet relations after Khrushchev’s 
visit to Beijing in October 1959. On October 21, he met with U.S. Assistant Secretary 
of State at the Presidential Office and shared his analysis of the Soviet leader’s visit to 
Beijing. He stated that there was no progress during Khrushchev’s three-day visit to 
Beijing, and Mao opposed Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence. He noted that 
the disagreement between Mao and Khrushchev had emerged two years before, and 
that their disagreement became more evident. Chiang pointed out that Khrushchev 
opposed the PRC’s creation of people’s communes, and Khrushchev did not desire that 
Mao would take a leadership position over communist parties in Asia, specifically in 
the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam. However, he continued, Khrushchev could not 
control Mao any longer. He said that for the past two years, Mao had been opposed to 
Khrushchev’s “peace offensive” and his opposition recently had surfaced as more 
radicalized.22 
In another meeting on the same day, Chiang Kai-shek again pointed out the 
                                                        
21 005-010205-00083-004, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
22 005-010100-00055-010, President Chiang Kai-shek Materials, Academia Historica, Taipei. Translated 
by author. 
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problems between Mao and Khrushchev, and he even asserted that the PRC and the 
Soviet Union were on the verge of a split. He then turned to the issue of U.S. support 
for the ROC and argued that the U.S.’s desire for the ROC to conduct non-military 
counter-offensive operations was not practical. Chiang expressed his wish that the 
United States would approve the ROC proposal to aid anti-CCP resistance movement 
through nonmilitary and paramilitary measures and referred to the creation of special 
paratrooper units as one method of doing so. He justified his demand by again pointing 
to the possibility of a Sino-Soviet clash and instability on the mainland.23 He stated 
that there was a divergence between Peng De-huai and Lin Biao. Even though Mao and 
Khrushchev might not yet be at a critical stage, the emergence of a large-scale 
resistance movement on the mainland could spur their clash, Chiang argued. He then 
predicted that the following year would present a great chance to take advantage of the 
prevailing situation, and he would guarantee that the action he proposed would not lead 
to a world war.24 
As this document shows, Chiang correctly observed that the Soviet Union and 
the PRC were close to splitting up and argued that it was imperative to promote the 
emergence of resistance movement to the PRC government within mainland China to 
accelerate the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations. In fact, Chiang had made a similar 
comment prior to the October 21st meetings. On April 16, 1959, he met the U.S. Army 
Vice Chief of Staff at the Presidential Residence in Shilin. Chiang noted that an 
anti-CCP demonstration was continuing and, in fact, expanding in Tibet, and from 
there the movement was spreading to Qinghai, Sichuan, and other areas. Pointing to 
the consensus between the ROC and the United States that the ROC government 
should use various means to assist an anti-CCP movement on the mainland in toppling 
the PRC, Chiang said that the ROC would seek an opportunity for joint U.S.-ROC 
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cooperation short of the use of military force to support the demonstrators.25 As these 
documents indicate, it is possible that the focus of Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-offensive 
against the mainland shifted to overthrowing the PRC government internally by aiding 
anti-communist movements on mainland China.  
 
Conclusion: 
This paper analyzed Chiang Kai-shek’s stance on the issue of returning to the 
Chinese mainland. In so doing, it highlights the issue of the offshore islands and 
Chiang Kia-shek’s view about the relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union; all 
information here is based on Taiwanese archival materials. This paper is one part of an 
ongoing project, and it is difficult to make a definitive statement on these two issues. 
Nonetheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. First, Taiwanese archival 
documents show that the United States was more actively encouraging the ROC to 
hold and even take advantage of the offshore islands, the Da-chen Islands in particular. 
It is possible that partly because of such an attitude from the U.S., Chiang Kai-shek’s 
hopes for returning to mainland China were strengthened or at least maintained. 
Second, Chiang paid close attention to PRC-Soviet relations, and when he discussed 
the subject with the United States, he emphasized that the Soviet Union would not 
intervene even if the ROC were to conduct a counter-offensive against the Chinese 
mainland. While it is difficult to judge whether Chiang’s analysis about the Soviet’s 
intentions concerning the defense of the PRC was motivated by his desire to entrap the 
United States or the outcome of more cool-headed logical thinking, his analysis of the 
signs of the split between Beijing and Moscow after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
was remarkably accurate. It is possible that Chiang may have thought that his chance 
of returning to mainland China would be greater in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. 
The critical piece that he needed to realize his dream was support from the United 
States, who ironically became more reluctant to offer such support as time went by. 
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